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
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25 April 1983

USSR Report

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

SOVIET COMMENTARY ON 'ARMS RACE'

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 2-4

[Unattributed lead article: "Who Is Whipping Up the Arms Race?"]

[Text]

OF LATE the USA is doing everything possible to carry into life its fantastic idea of Pax Americana. In an endeavour to achieve military superiority over the USSR, it initiates new and new spirals of the arms race. Production lines continue to put out the latest types of lethal weapons. In an attempt to justify its actions in the eyes of the world public, the USA unleashed a wide-scale propaganda campaign trying to prove the unprovable. The President himself, Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger and other high-ranking officials of the American Administration repeat over and over again that in every type of weapon the USSR allegedly enjoys an advantage over the United States, that Moscow threatens peace and is the initiator of the arms race.

What is the real state of affairs and what is the Soviet Union's stand in connection with the latest statements of the American officials? **Answers to these questions are stated in an interview given by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR, to a TASS correspondent last December.**

Contrary to the Facts

The Minister of Defence emphasised that assertions about the Soviet military superiority did not conform with reality. The equilibrium between the USSR and the USA in the field of strategic armaments was thoroughly verified as a result of nearly seven years of talks between the two sides in preparation for the SALT-2 Treaty. This equilibrium was admitted in 1979-1980 by the leaders of the previous US Administration, James Carter, Henry Brown and Cyrus Vance. Therefore President Reagan and Weinberger have no grounds

to assert that within a year or two the USSR has forged ahead the USA in strategic armaments. The point is that the United States has set itself the aim of upsetting the existing parity and achieving military superiority over the USSR.

If the military power of the two sides is considered in terms of other armaments, notes the Minister of Defence, it is wrong to compare the forces and weapons of only the USSR and the USA. An objective assessment may be obtained by comparing the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

As to nuclear weapons in Europe, each side has deployed about a thousand carriers. As to the number of nuclear charges deliverable to the target at one go, NATO already has a 50 per cent superiority at present. The leader of the US Administration is misleading public opinion when he reduces the whole issue to the medium-range land-based missiles of the USSR and the USA. Inasmuch as over the past two decades the United States, for a number of reasons, did not have weapons of this class in Western Europe, the Soviet Union, following its logic, must dismantle its missiles. The leaders of the Republican Administration keep mum about the forward-based systems and leave them intact. And they call this irresponsible idea the "zero option," which is prompted by the selfsame striving to achieve superiority and by nothing else.

The actual picture is such that the Soviet missiles and bombers, as Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov stressed, are confronting the following types of nuclear weapons now existing in Europe: American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, located at air bases in a number of West European countries; nuclear weapons on board American aircraft carriers kept on the alert in the seas adjoining Europe; British and French medium-range land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and bombers of corresponding types. In determining the composition of the medium-range forces it is impossible to ignore these weapons, as the United States is doing at the talks in Geneva. After all, these are not tactical weapons — their range (radius) of action is between 1,000 and 4,500 km. They are capable of striking blows at targets on the territory of the USSR right up to the Urals. The America's attempt to exclude the troops of the allies and the US Air Force stationed in Europe when comparing the forces of the two sides is aimed at frightening the West Europeans and securing their consent to the rearming of Europe. Such an approach does not conform to the principles of equality and equal security, and the USSR will not allow these plans to be realised.

The US President asserts that the Soviet Union has violated the unilateral moratorium declared on the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country. It is yet another attempt to sow mistrust towards the Soviet Union's position. Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov said in this respect: "The USSR is true to its word. It has not deployed the above missiles in the European part and has even unilaterally reduced their numbers considerably."

As regards the correlation of the conventional armed forces of the two sides, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has more of some of these forces and NATO has more of others. On the whole, there is an approximate balance of strength in them.

Thus, as concerns strategic nuclear armaments, or medium-range weapons in Europe, or the conventional armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, there is approximate parity. In this parity the Soviet Union sees the embodiment of the principle of equal security. It considers that the application of this principle must be expressed not in the endless buildup of armaments but in concerted efforts to lower the levels of military confrontation. This is what the USSR aspires to at the negotiations conducted with the United States on military questions.

The United States, and the United States alone, was and is the initiator of the arms race. The United States was the first to create and use atomic weapons, to build thousands of heavy bombers — carriers of nuclear weapons and launch the mass-scale production and deployment of intercontinental missiles as well as the buildup of nuclear-powered missile submarines with ballistic missiles on board. The USA was the first to equip ballistic missiles with multiple independently-targeted warheads, and start the production of neutron and binary chemical weapons and the militarisation of outer space.

The American President keeps silent about the fact that during the last two decades the buildup of the US strategic armaments has been a continuous process. In the first half of the 1970s alone, 550 Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with three independently-targeted warheads each were adopted for service instead of the Minuteman-1 missiles, and simultaneously work was carried out to increase the yield of the warheads and equip the Minuteman-3 missiles with a remote-controlled retargeting system. 496 Poseidon-3 ballistic missiles, with 10-14 warheads

each, were sited on 31 nuclear-powered submarines. Almost 270 heavy bombers were equipped to carry 20 SRAM nuclear missiles each. During the period the naval forces were provided with new nuclear submarines carrying Trident missiles, work was under way on the development, production and deployment of long-range air-, sea- and land-based cruise missiles.

Programme Aimed at Upsetting Military Parity

President Reagan's strategic programme for the 1980s, the desire to rearm Western Europe, and the colossal level of military spending show that Washington whipped up and is now whipping up the arms race. The Soviet Union was forced merely to respond to the military preparations of the USA. On the other hand, it has repeatedly proposed to the United States to desist from the development of new systems of mass destruction weapons. But there has been no response to any of the Soviet proposals. Moreover, the USA is violating existing agreements.

The realisation of the "dense pack" mode of basing MX missiles would be a gross violation of one of the central provisions of the Soviet-American accords recorded in the SALT-1 and the SALT-2 treaties. (In particular, it violates Article 1 of SALT-1 and Article 4 of SALT-2). However, Weinberger's "arguments" that new silos should not be identified with launching installations, that they are only shelters, are untenable, said the USSR Minister of Defence. If the Pentagon tries to use some of the presently existing silo launchers now used for Minuteman missiles, for the new MX missiles, the volume of such silos would increase above the limits agreed upon between the USSR and the USA, which is a violation of the SALT-2 Treaty.

According to Washington's plans, provision is made for the future construction of additional "dummy" silo launching installations with a view to deliberately hampering verification of missile deployment by national technical facilities. Nor is the possibility of covering the area in which MX missiles are based with an ABM system excluded. This would be a direct violation of the anti-missile defence treaty and the protocol to it, in accordance with which the US has the right to transfer the ABM system from the area of the ICBM base at Grand Forks only to the Washington area. The Administration officials are well aware of this.

The planned deployment of MX missiles on US territory and of medium-range missiles in Western Europe amounts to a programme of eliminating the existing military equilibrium and achieving superiority over the USSR on a global and regional scale. It is a new and extremely dangerous spiral in the arms race. The USSR Minister of Defence noted that 100 MX ICBMs contain 1,000 high-accuracy independently-targeted warheads with a yield of 600 kt. This means that the destructive power of each warhead is 30 times greater than that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. The MX missiles are weapons that destabilise the general strategic situation. The same can be said of other aspects of Reagan's "strategic programme."

The deployment of about 600 medium-range missiles in Western Europe would also dangerously change the situation for the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community. These missiles located in proximity to the Soviet borders, directly complement the US strategic nuclear potential located on the American continent. Therefore the USSR doubts the sincerity of US intentions to reach mutually acceptable accord at the Geneva talks on medium-range weapons. One unwittingly comes to believe that the American side, using the "zero option" as a screen at the talks, is in fact heading towards full-scale deployment of its new missiles in Europe.

Adequate Response

The United States asserts that its new missiles are intended for use against the Soviet SS-20 missiles and for defence of the West European countries. This is a fraud. US missiles with a range of 2,500 km are first-strike weapons and are intended for use in a nuclear war in Europe. According to the Pentagon's plans, they will be targeted primarily on the USSR's state and military administration organs and also on Soviet ICBMs and other strategic installations. The flying time of Pershing-2 is about 6 minutes and therefore, the aggressor believes, it will be difficult to take retaliatory measures during this time. Consequently, it is not a question of a simple arithmetic addition of 600 missiles to the US strategic potential, but of a qualitative change of the strategic situation in favour of the United States. The USSR cannot fail to reckon with this fact.

The Soviet Government is closely following the situation and drawing proper conclusions. The American Administration will not be able to intimidate the Soviet Union with the development of "superprotected" MX missiles, nor with the deployment of Pershings and Tomahawks in Western

Europe. If the present leadership in the White House, contrary to common sense and in defiance of the peoples' will for peace, noted Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, throws down the gauntlet and sets about deploying the MX missiles, the Soviet Union will respond by deploying a new intercontinental ballistic missile of the same class, with its characteristics in no way inferior to those of the MX. The USSR is also capable, if need be, of giving an effective and timely response to other threats from Washington.

* * *

The interview of Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR, evoked a wide response in the world. Those who are whipping up the arms race should lend an attentive ear to it. The USSR and the fraternal socialist countries concern themselves with maintaining their defence capacity on the proper level and will do everything to safeguard their revolutionary gains.

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WARSAW PACT AND GROUPS OF FORCES

NATURE OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES' ARMIES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 51-53

[Article by Col V. Semin: "Socialist Countries' Armies--Armies of a New Type"]

[Text]

AS IMPERIALISM loses its positions, its most reactionary forces and state ruling circles intensify the arms race, chart a course for increasing the war hysteria in order to change the correlation of forces in the world in their favour, and call for a "crusade" against world socialism. The primary role in defending socialism is played by the military organisations of socialist states — the armies of a new, socialist type. Armies of all socialist states have many common features with the Soviet Armed Forces as concerns their social and political nature and historical purpose. Though each of these armies has its own specifics (origin, formation, national traditions and customs) they are based on common principles — all of them are an organ of a socialist state, all of them are guided by Marxist-Leninist parties.

The nature of the army as a state body stems from the social relations prevailing in society, from the social and state system. This means that the determinant of any army of a new type is its social nature.

From the very outset the armies of the socialist community took advantage of the wealth of experience of Soviet military construction. The USSR supported the peoples of fraternal countries with all its might; from it they received moral and technical aid in forming national armies.

Socialist armies embody the new type of relations existing in the socialist community. Both in peacetime and war trials they reflect the political, economic, social and ideological foundations of socialism. These armies serve the interests of the

workers; the relations of cooperation and mutual aid governing in the socialist society permeate all the activities of the military collectives.

Quite a different situation exists in the imperialist armies, which serve the ruling exploiter classes rather than the people. The soldiers of imperialist armies, defending the property and interests of the monopoly bourgeoisie, strive to enrich themselves as well. The spirit of money-grubbing, animosity and rivalry is characteristic for interrelations between the servicemen of capitalist states and for the whole society based on private property.

One of the most important features of socialist armies is that their soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals are inseparably linked with the working class. The representatives of workers introduce into the army and navy a revolutionary ideology and morale, high social, ideological and moral qualities, knowledge and professional habits, and the spirit of collectivism. The socialist armies comprise not only workers but also representatives of the peasantry and intelligentsia rallied around the interests and ideals of the working class. All of them have common interests and a common lofty aim — to defend socialism against the encroachments of imperialism. Therefore the armies of socialist countries have no such irreconcilable contradictions that are so typical of bourgeois armies. The great stratum of Communists and members of young communist organisations in the people's armies is striking evidence of their character and social make-up.

For example, in the Bulgarian People's Army 86 per cent of officers and generals are members of the Bulgarian Communist Party, in the Hungarian Army over 80 per cent of the officers and 35 per cent of the noncommissioned officers are members of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, in the GDR National People's Army almost 97 per cent of the officers and 67 per cent of the noncoms are members of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. A similar situation is observed in the Wojsko Polskie, in the Army of the Socialist Republic of Romania, in the Czechoslovakian People's Army, in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba and other armies of the socialist countries.

Socio-political relations and the structure of socialist society also find their reflection in the political purpose of the armies. The working class rejected the false bourgeois thesis about the political "neutrality" of the army, that the army is "out of politics." The socialist armies, being military organisations, are also a political means of solving important social problems such as education of

the personnel in the spirit of communist ideology and morale, social and self-discipline. They provide the servicemen with wide possibilities for exercising their civic duties and rights.

Socialist armies are the most democratic armies in the world, the most striking evidence of this being the social and political equality of servicemen, the existence in the army of various political and social organisations and institutions, and participation of servicemen in socialist emulation for the best fulfilment of practical tasks.

Socialist armies are reared in the spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology, proletarian internationalism and friendship among the peoples. For instance, the Czechoslovakian People's Army includes Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Romanians, Hungarians, Germans, Serbs and representatives of other nationalities serve together in the Romanian Army. Socialist armies know no national discord; the chauvinism and national discrimination which are prevalent in the armies of imperialist states are alien to them. Representatives of national minorities serving in the armed forces of socialist countries are full and equal defenders of their country. Truly friendly relations existing among the servicemen of different nationalities in socialist armies reflect the successful solution of the nationalities question in these countries on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

As the armed bulwark of workers' power in their countries, the socialist armies perform two functions: internal and external.

The socialist army performs its internal function while the vestiges of the exploiter classes fighting against the new system still exist in society. In our day, for instance, the Wojsko Polskie is performing just such a function. The internal function of socialist armies is of relatively short duration. It disappears with the successes in the building of socialism and the elimination of exploiter classes in the country. This has already taken place in the Soviet Union and this fact is correspondingly reflected in the CPSU Programme and the Constitution of the USSR.

But the socialist armies continue to exist and develop, expressing the will and interests of the working people by performing their external function. It consists in defending the countries against the attacks of international imperialism. Today when socialism has transcended the boundaries of one country and a world socialist system has been formed, the external function of safeguarding socialism is not a purely national problem of each socialist country. Any socialist army, together with other fraternal armies, defends, in one way or another, the whole socialist community, thus exercising its international duty.

The creation, in response to aggressive actions of imperialism, of the Warsaw Treaty was a qualitatively new step in the construction of a collective system of defence of socialist countries. L. I. Brezhnev noted: "We formed this community principally to counter the imperialist threat, the aggressive imperialist military blocs, and to safeguard in common the cause of socialism and peace."

The persistent upgrading of socialist armies' combat might should be also regarded as one of their most important features. This feature manifests itself, as is known, in the armies of modern bourgeois states, too. But in the socialist armies, armies of a new type, its purpose is fundamentally different: to ensure peaceful conditions for building socialism and communism, and preserving universal peace.

The socialist community countries' successes in the development of the economy, science and technology have enabled them to strengthen their defence, equip their armed forces with modern weapons and enhance their combat might. The backbone of land forces is tank and motorised infantry formations characterised by high mobility, manoeuvrability, fire and striking power. The fire salvo of a modern motorised infantry formation of the Bulgarian People's Army exceeds, for example, that of an infantry division of first postwar years almost eight-fold, the manoeuvrability more than seven-fold, while the power availability per serviceman increased during this time more than 30 times.

The modern period has witnessed the rapid development of the air defence troops of the Warsaw Treaty countries and increased air target engagement effectiveness. Today the Air Force and Air Defence Troops of the Polish People's Republic amount to about 30 per cent of all the armed forces of the country, while in the prewar years their share was only 3.8 per cent.

The navies of socialist countries are also characterised by high fighting efficiency. They comprise surface ships and submarines, missiles, naval aviation, coastal artillery and modern auxiliary equipment.

In recent years the fraternal socialist armies have attained a higher stage of development and increased their combat skill. A radical turn has been made towards practical mastering of the whole gamut of problems associated with maintaining high combat readiness, improving the personnel's field, flight and naval training standards and carrying out exercises which would best contribute to the multifarious training of forces.

The entire history of socialist armies shows that the organisers and leaders of these armies have

always been and are now the Communist and Workers' Parties. Owing to their guiding role in the political organisation system of socialist society, the Communist and Workers' Parties control the defensive activities of the states as well. This is the main general principle of the construction of socialist armies.

The guidance by Communist and Workers' Parties of military construction and the armed forces as a whole is based on the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory and is carried out in compliance with the laws and legal rules existing in the socialist countries.

The socialist armies today are distinguished for their solid military discipline, moral and political spirit, the high tactical and operational maturity of the command personnel and their skilful control of troops in various military activities.

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ARMED FORCES

ARMY GEN V. PETROV ON DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 5-8

[Article by Army Gen V. Petrov, commander-in-chief of the Land Forces, deputy minister of Defense of the USSR, hero of the Soviet Union, under the heading "February 23--Soviet Army and Navy Day": "Safeguarding Peace"]

[Text]

General of the Army V. Petrov was born in 1917 in the village of Chernolesskoye, Stavropol Territory. He began his military service in 1939. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) he was in the regular army. In the postwar period V. Petrov successively went through command and staff appointments in the tactical and operational link. He was commander of the Order of the Red Banner Far Eastern Military District, and First Deputy of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces. From December 1980 he has been Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces—Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR.

For sixty-five years the Soviet Armed Forces have been defending vigilantly the gains of socialism and peace. The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution evoked furious resistance on the part of the overthrown exploiter classes, of all the forces of world imperialism. Therefore, the creation of the Soviet Army became a historical necessity and priority task of the Communist Party

and the Soviet Government. V. I. Lenin, the great strategist of the revolution, exercised personal control over the building of the Soviet Armed Forces. He gave precise substantiation of the military programme of the proletarian revolution, developed the theory of the defence of the Socialist Motherland, scientifically grounded the main principles of Soviet military construction and threw light on the specifics and sources of the Soviet Armed Forces' might. And when in February 1918 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government called the people to rise to the defence of their young state, thousands upon thousands of workers and peasants joined the ranks of the Red Army. Under their colours, on which were inscribed the words: "Peace, Equality, Brotherhood," Russians were joined by Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Kazakhs, Georgians and Letts. In battle with the enemies they showed an example of unbending revolutionary spirit, courage and fidelity to their duty.

During the grim years of the struggle against the White Guard troops and foreign invaders the foremost role of the Leninist Party as the organiser of the defence of the October Revolution's gains became particularly vivid. The Party sent to the fronts, where the future of the revolution was in the balance, its best cadres.

The fighting organ of the Party in the defence of the revolutionary gains was its Central Committee. Under Lenin's direct leadership it solved fundamental problems of military politics and strategy, defence of the country, and the build-up of the army and navy, and successively implemented the principle of unity of the political and military leadership.

In the years of gruelling trials great help was rendered to the Soviet Republic and its army by class brothers from abroad. Many

thousands of them fought in the ranks of the Red Army. Under the slogan: "Hands Off Soviet Russia!", the international working class, the working people of the capitalist countries, held in check the forces of the counter-revolution and weakened the pressure of the capitalist invaders.

AFTER THE END of the Civil War, during which the White Guard troops and foreign invaders were defeated, the Communist Party concentrated all the efforts of the Soviet people on restoring and developing the national economy, on peaceful socialist construction. The imperialists attempted more than once to test militarily the strength of the Soviet frontiers. Therefore, while tackling the problem of building socialism, the Party and the people at the same time strengthened the country's defence capability. Automobile, tractor, aviation and other branches of industry were set up. The Soviet Army and Navy were rearmed on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology. Side by side with the enormous work of the technical rearmament of the forces, the CPSU paid great attention to the training of the command, political, engineering and technical personnel. Combat training of the forces was also upgraded. The activity of the political bodies and Party organisations in fostering high moral and combat qualities in the fighting men was stepped up.

Foreseeing the possibility of an armed clash with imperialism, the Communist Party defined its military policy, and comprehensively and in good time prepared the country, army and navy to repel aggression. And though history gave the Soviet people too little time for this, the fulfilment of the prewar five-year plans had laid the foundation of the victory won by the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.

From the first days of the war, the working people of the country, responding to the call of the Leninist Party, rose to the defence of the Socialist Motherland. In the Brest fortress, at Moscow and Stalingrad, near Kursk, on the Dnieper, in Byelorussia and the Baltic, at all fronts the sons and daughters of the multinational Soviet people fought courageously and staunchly.

During the Great Patriotic War the immortal feat of Alexander Matrosov, who covered an embrasure of an enemy pillbox with his body had been repeated by more than 300 Soviet fighting men. Like pilot Nikolai Gastello, the crews of Soviet aircraft over 300 times aimed their damaged planes at concentrations of enemy forces. Over 200 Soviet fighting men blew up themselves and the nazis surrounding them with grenades.

Among those whom the Motherland awarded Orders and medals were sons and daughters of all nationalities and ethnic groups of the country. Over 11,600 fighting men were honoured with the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. They include Sergei Yermolayev, a Russian, Ivan Zinchenko, a Ukrainian, Alikbai Kasayev, a Kazakh, Djumash Asanaliyev, a Kirghiz. For the crossing of the Dnieper alone 2,438 officers and men — representatives of all the fraternal republics — were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the war the unity of the army and the people manifested itself as never before. The Party's slogan "All for the Front! All for Victory!" became immutable for all peoples. Unprecedented labour heroism was displayed by the Soviet people in the rear.

The victory of the Soviet Union in battle against fascism was quite natural. It was the triumph of the Soviet social and state systems, social economy, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the unshakable friendship of the peoples of the USSR. It was the Communist Party which in struggle for the honour and independence of the Motherland led and inspired the Soviet people. By the end of the war over 60 per cent Communists were in the army and navy. It was truly a fighting party!

IN THE POSTWAR period the Communist Party spared no pains to make the Soviet Armed Forces a solid fusion of high technical equipping, military skill and indestructible morale. The

army and navy are provided with all they need for life, combat training and for carrying out important missions assigned to them.

The Strategic Rocket Forces now possess missiles having practically an unlimited flying range and great accuracy of destroying targets, and are capable of carrying nuclear warheads of enormous yield.

The Land Forces have been refurbished substantially. This is the most numerous fighting service, possessing diverse sophisticated combat equipment and first-class armaments. Modern tanks and IFVs have high cross-country ability, endurance and powerful armaments. This is a striking force possessing considerable stability against the effect of mass destruction weapons and good manoeuvrability. The basis of the fire power of the Land Forces is the operational and tactical rocket forces. The striking power of the motorised infantry, protected with armour and fully mechanised, has also increased.

The Air Defence Forces are a reliable shield of the country, the army and navy, protecting them from air attacks. Their highly effective missile complexes, all-weather supersonic fighter-interceptors ensure a successful combat against enemy aircraft.

The Air Force is provided with supersonic all-weather aircraft. These aircraft are capable of developing speed 100-150 per cent greater than that of the sonic speed and gaining an altitude of over 30 km.

The Soviet Navy has become an ocean and nuclear-missile navy. The basis of its power is nuclear submarines armed with missiles and up-to-date torpedoes and also a naval missile-carrying air arm.

However, the strength of the army and navy lies not only in modern armaments. Their main wealth is the personnel — ideologically convinced courageous officers and men. As was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress — "Sons and grandsons of heroes of the Great Patriotic War are now in the ranks of the defenders of the Soviet Union. They have not gone through the grim trials that fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are devoted to the heroic traditions of our army and our people." Today practically 100 per cent of the fighting men have no less than an 8-year education and the portion of the servicemen with a higher or secondary general education comprises nearly 80 per cent. Over 84 per cent of the present day draftees called up to the army and navy have various technical skills. Every second officer has a higher and special military education. The majority of them are Communists.

THE MOST IMPORTANT source of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces, one of the regularities of their development, is the leadership of the Communist Party. Realising the idea of the great Lenin on the defence of the Socialist Motherland, the Party sees to it that the Soviet people always remember the immortal behests of the great leader: "Comrades, be vigilant, safeguard the defence potential of the country, strengthen the Red Army to the utmost."

The unity of the people and its army is unshakable. The fighting men of the army and navy, as full-fledged citizens of their country, actively participate in the socio-political life of the people. Patronage relations between military units and collectives of the working people are constantly maintained and developed.

The Armed Forces fulfil their historic mission of safeguarding socialism and peace in a common formation with the armies of the socialist states — the Warsaw Treaty member-countries. All the fraternal armies have common aims, common missions, i.e. to faithfully serve their peoples, to reliably defend their peaceful labour and socialist gains. It is for these purposes that exchange of experience in operational and combat training is being widely organised, while troop training and cooperation is stepped up in the joint exercises.

All allied armies possess a high combat standard and are in a state of constant combat readiness. The international situation which has sharply worsened of late, compels them to do so. The aggressive forces of imperialism, particularly the US brand, are trying to push international relations off the path of detente to that of confrontation and dangerous brinkmanship. They are out to recarve the political map of the world, and resort to various kinds of sanctions and threats of using armed force.

Washington is trying — and this was repeatedly confirmed by top US Administration officials — "to restore the USA's leading role in the world." This is precisely the goal of the new American strategy, aimed at achieving "full indisputable military superiority" over the USSR. It is obvious that under the present level of scientific and technological progress in the Soviet Union such a course is nothing more than a political adventurism. Nevertheless, Washington is stubbornly implementing it. Hence the growth of the US military budget and the long-term programme of bolstering American strategic nuclear forces, the plans of deploying a new generation of nuclear and conventional weapons, and the production of neutron, chemical and other types of the mass destruction weapons. Washington is attempting to tether other NATO countries to its aggressive course.

Constantly taking care to strengthen its defence capability, the Soviet Union consistently carries out the course aimed at strengthening peace which was clearly formulated at the 26th CPSU Congress and developed and concretised in the subsequent documents of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government.

* * *

During the 65 years of their existence, the Soviet Armed Forces have traversed a long and glorious road. Closely rallied around the Communist Party, its Leninist Central Committee, in a single formation with the fraternal armies of the socialist community, they are reliably safeguarding peace and are ready to repulse any aggressor instantly.

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ARMED FORCES

LT GENERAL VOLKOGONOV CONTINUES HIS DISCUSSION OF MILITARY HEROISM

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 20-22

[Article by Lt Gen D. Volkogonov, under the heading "The Making of a Soldier": "Military Heroism"]

[Text]

Readiness to perform a feat of valour or an act of heroism hinges above all on a person's ideological convictions, his ethical maturity and moral strength. Logically, a heroic deed adds up to the following. The person in question is fully aware of the possible consequences of the step he is about to make (which sometimes takes only a fraction of a second). The performance of the deed is usually accompanied by powerful feelings, such as a sense of patriotism, hatred for the enemy, military honour and excitement in combat. An act which is motivated by socially meaningful causes, the latter being perceived as a personal reason, is a truly heroic act.

This forms the basis of a decision which implies an aim and ways to achieve it. And, finally, the ultimate element of this process is a deliberate act characterised by a manifestation of strong will power. It calls for mobilisation of all of the person's mental and physical powers and abilities for carrying out this decision. In other words, a heroic act represents a dialectical unity of a spiritual and a practical element. The spiritual element mainly comprises moral and political components and the practical — will power.

If a man's readiness to perform a feat is chiefly determined by his convictions, the dynamics of the heroic act is largely conditioned by will power. At the same time it would be difficult to perform a feat of valour today, unless you are professionally competent and proficient. It is not fortuitous that such concepts as staunchness and courage are inseparable from those of skillfulness and competence. M. Gallai, the well-known Soviet test pilot, remarked that knowledge not only backs daring, but also executes some of its functions. Skill and competence give a man confidence

in his ability and heighten the effectiveness of his actions.

This poses the question: what is the relationship between the heroic and the courageous? What does the latter manifest itself in?

Courage is the ability to suppress the sense of fear, negative emotions, to see and appraise danger soberly. This important moral-combat quality often plays a decisive role in situations which call for undaunted spirit, will power, persistence and endurance over a prolonged period.

It follows that heroism and courage are similar in nature and character. Courage creates the intellectual preconditions for the feat and provides the will power component. A man who has performed a feat will always be a man of courage. It would even be fair to say that a feat of valour is a supreme achievement of courage.

As a social, moral phenomenon, military heroism is characterised by a number of specific features. The heroic character of servicemen has been revealed on a mass scale only under socialism. The heroic behaviour of Soviet soldiers, their unexampled courage have moulded in the minds of the Soviet people the idea that the meaning of the term serviceman and the term hero is very close. This is very meaningful. The servicemen of the first socialist army are inspired by the noblest ideas, they have been educated in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, fidelity to duty. They are, therefore, always ready to perform a feat of valour.

The Soviet Homeland awards high decorations for heroic deeds. During the Great Patriotic War over 11,000 officers and men were honoured with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for acts of heroism and over seven million were awarded Orders and medals.

As an organic element of military service, heroism manifests itself in peaceful conditions, too. Peacetime offers many opportunities to perform feats of valour. Soviet servicemen display courage and heroism not only in mastering new weaponry and other combat equipment, but also in the development of the economy, and construction of civilian projects.

Here is a case in point. In July the mercury reached plus 30° Centigrade in the area of the Baikal Amur Railway. The heat wave was followed by warm downpours. The rivers in the taiga forests overflowed their banks. The level of the swift Bureya River rose several metres. There was a real threat to a newly-built 620 metre bridge. The flood cut the bridge off from the banks. To save the bridge it was decided to land a helicopter-borne party onto the structure to remove the uprooted trees that were pressing onto the piers and clogging the space between them. A battalion under

L. Svetlov formed up. The commanding officer said he needed volunteers for the job which entailed risk to life. There was not a single man in the unit who was willing to be left behind. The men worked the whole night removing the trees, which formed a sort of a dam. Finally, persistence and courage saved the bridge.

Another essential feature of military heroism is the effort to resolve contradictions through the use of force, contradictions arising in combat. The use of arms by Soviet servicemen is a forced measure that is taken in retaliation to action by the aggressor. Therefore, the moral readiness to carry out, at any time, the order of the Homeland stems from a profound realisation of the need for the use of revolutionary force against the enemies of socialism.

Military heroism largely reflects in unity the ability to take bold action and to carry out orders of superiors. In moral terms heroism means that the serviceman assumes a responsibility that is much higher than that officially required by orders. A Russian military leader of the past aptly put it: when you receive an order, carry it out implicitly, but give due thought to it. Though this appears paradoxical, it is very meaningful: while carrying out an order, a serviceman must display maximum initiative and resourcefulness.

A hero is always a patriot of his Socialist Homeland. Heroism is deeply rooted in the concept of Homeland, it stems from the need to fight for its security and prosperity. The most beloved, famous, legendary heroes of the Soviet people were devoted sons and daughters of the Homeland. They drew their strength from its invaluable cultural heritage, revolutionary, combat and labour traditions, and the heroic history of their people. The heroic feat of a man, of a collective is always a patriotic act, because only a social, a people's common cause imparts meaning to such an exploit.

The socialist way of life, the entire system of instruction and education develops in the Soviet people, in Soviet servicemen the readiness to perform feats. The most outstanding factors which contribute to a readiness to perform an act of valour, factors which play a particularly important role in army and naval service, are: ideological-political education, fidelity to military duty, lofty moral-combat qualities that are moulded in the process of political education and psychological training of men for action in modern warfare.

Unless a person is sure that he must display courage in pursuit of duty, he will not be ready to

perform an exploit. History has on record for posterity many unexampled deeds which were manifestations of enthusiasm, courage and heroism. The most outstanding of these stemmed from communist ideology and convictions. The men and women who performed them were sure that they were serving a righteous and just cause.

The exploit of General Dmitry Karbyshev has been recorded for perpetuity in the history of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. He was captured by the nazis while unconscious. Since he was a distinguished military expert, the nazis were eager to woo him and to win his cooperation. But as a Soviet general he rejected all their advances with contempt. The hitlerites promised him a big reward, then they threatened and tortured him. They could not break his will. He died as a hero, but would not betray his country. What was it that gave the Soviet patriot the strength to remain staunch in the unbearable conditions of nazi dungeons? The answer is in his words:

"I do not lose my convictions as I lose my teeth through lack of vitamins in the camp ration."

Communist convictions form the pivotal moral-political quality of the personality, they are a gauge of his ideological maturity. They are a combination of three cardinal elements: scientific knowledge, ideological steeling and preparedness to act in practice in keeping with these requirements in everyday life. Phrased differently, this means:

First, to be a man of convictions one must master Marxist-Leninist theory, equip himself with knowledge in various fields, such as political science, technology, natural and special sciences.

Second, only knowledge transformed into convictions is of spiritual value.

Third, a man of convictions is one whose deeds, actions and behaviour are in keeping with his ideological principles.

Life in the army and navy offers many examples of deeds that conform to lofty ideological principles. A serviceman of communist convictions is distinguished for his conscientious approach to his military duty, for his efforts to improve his combat proficiency, for his desire to help a comrade, for his principled approach to the job he is doing, and for his constant endeavour to improve the level of his knowledge and skill.

Service in the Armed Forces is an important social educational institute. Owing to the specific purpose of the army and navy, to the specific character of their functions, the men serving in the forces intensively develop courage, a readiness to perform feats of valour or acts of heroism. The

army forms a major component in the system which moulds the new man in socialist society: namely the family, school and work. As such it plays a big role in his maturing. It equips him with the qualities of a citizen-serviceman who is aware of his civic duty and is prepared to perform feats of valour.

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ARMED FORCES

POLITICAL CLASSES FOR SERVICEMEN DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 27-28

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Drozdov, under the heading "The Making of a Soldier": "Political Classes"]

[Text]

Political education was introduced in the Red Army soon after it was formed. However, its forms and methods have changed and improved depending on the situation and the missions assigned. During the grim period of the Civil War and foreign military intervention (1918-1920) the most widespread types of political education were talks, reading of newspapers (because many of the Red Army men were then illiterate) and also brief rallies. However, regular political studies in the Armed Forces were already taking shape then. Thus, in 1920 many of the Red Army units introduced compulsory studies in elementary political education with one hour lessons everyday. Starting from 1924 various forms of political education in the subunits were combined under the title of political studies or political classes.

Political classes are a regular compulsory form of ideological education for privates and sergeants in the USSR Armed Forces. It is the responsibility of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy to produce the curricula, aids in methods and textbooks.

The curricula are strictly differentiated. For instance, there are curricula for soldiers and seamen for the

initial stage of political studies. In addition, there are plans for political studies for soldiers, seamen, sergeants and starshinas for the summer and winter periods of combat training. Depending on the concrete situation, the nature of duties and missions assigned, curricula may be subject to revision.

The soldiers, seamen, sergeants and starshinas study the ideological heritage of V. I. Lenin, in particular his theory of defence of the Socialist Homeland, and the history of the USSR Armed Forces and their combat traditions. Special attention is paid to military education and the tasks arising from the decisions of the Party and Government, the Constitution of the USSR, and also from the orders of the USSR Minister of Defence. The servicemen are informed about the socialist community and are kept abreast of the international situation. They are given an insight into the aggressive essence of imperialism. The obvious conclusion from these studies is that the men better understand the need to build up the country's defence capacity and to upgrade the USSR Armed Forces.

Political education implies formation of study groups, selection and

training of lecturers, instructors and assistant instructors of political study groups, appointment of suitable rooms for political classes, provision of instructors and servicemen with textbooks and training aids, checking of attendance, appraisal of progress in political science, organisation of individual study of recommended literature.

Political classes for privates and sergeants are conducted twice a week for two hours in the morning and with seamen and starshinas — once a week for three hours running. The days and hours for these classes are fixed by order of the unit or ship commander. As a rule, the study group will consist of a platoon or equivalent subunit for the privates and seamen, and of the company or battalion for sergeants or starshinas. A study group should not be too small. Neither should it exceed 25-30 men. The groups are formed in keeping with the procedure laid down by the formation commander and the chief of the political department with due account of the specific duties carried out by the men.

Instruction in the study groups is conducted by officers: commanders of platoons, companies, squadrons, ships' departments, political workers of subunits, and chiefs of services.

The subunit commander and his deputy for political affairs select assistant instructors. This is done in conjunction with the Party and Young Communist League organisations. As a rule, an assistant instructor will be a sergeant or starshina who is well versed in politics and is proficient in the line of duty.

Political studies are conducted in the form of lectures and seminars. This means that after a lecture the men will individually study the recommended literature and participate in seminars. This method opens broader possibilities for creativity in studying materials. In addition, the men acquire the necessary skill in presenting report and take part in a comradely exchange of opinions.

The method of narration accompanied by lively exchange is also employed. As a rule, the instructor of the group will speak on the subject matter. As he sets forth the theme, he may ask the servicemen questions on it. If he is not satisfied with their knowledge of the material, he will give them additional explanations.

To illustrate how such lessons are conducted in the form of lectures and seminars, we will quote the case of Senior Lieutenant Turshu's group.

After a lecture the officer organises individual studies of the men. He will give each man a concrete assignment with due account of the latter's background. He will give a list of works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, decisions issued by the Party and Government, articles that have appeared in newspapers and journals, and pages in the textbooks to be studied. He will tell the men which works and other materials they should read first and which they should read later. He will tell his assistant to select the necessary

visual aids and name the men who are to prepare synopses.

The study of the theme is completed at a seminar. The latter enables the men to deepen and consolidate the knowledge they acquired at the lecture and in the course of their individual studies.

Senior Lieutenant Turshu opens the seminar with introductory remarks. He repeats the main questions covered by the theme, asks the men to pay special attention to certain points and then gives the floor to the man who has prepared the synopsis. Then another man is called upon to elucidate a definite question. His statement is usually supplemented by other speakers who state their ideas on the problems raised at the seminar. It is the task of the instructor to organise the discussion in a way that will enable each man to show what he has assimilated and to develop everybody's creative effort.

The talk at the seminar is closely linked up with current developments, with the tasks the company is working on. Senior Lieutenant Turshu tries to create an atmosphere of ease, he does not curb the initiative of the speakers. He wants each to state his view and to speak frankly on matters that concern and interest him.

Visual aids, maps, albums, placards, prints of pictures are widely used at political lessons. Slides, magnetic tape recordings, etc. are also very helpful.

Many of the instructors of political study groups are young men themselves who have not yet acquired the experience that makes up an efficient fighter on the ideological front. They themselves have a lot to learn.

The main method they use is individual study of works by the classics of Marxism-Leninism, decisions of the CPSU, political, military and historical literature and literature on methods. Before every study period (summer or winter) they attend seminars on methods organised by the political organs. Regular seminars have proved to be a good school in theory and methods for study group instructors. At these seminars the more experienced and competent officers read lectures or reports to them.

For example, in the Byelorussian Military District seminars for political study group instructors are held at least twice a month. The first part of the seminar is usually devoted to a report on the theme of the lesson in political science and another to the methods for the conduct of these lessons.

Seminars equip the political study group instructors with knowledge and experience. At the same time they are a form of monitoring the political level of the instructors and the level of their preparations for the lessons.

Seminars do not exhaust all the problems in the training of study group instructors. They are effective only if individual work is conducted with the instructors, especially younger ones.

Political classes are particularly effective if the knowledge of the soldiers, seamen, sergeants and starshinas is duly appraised. The level of their political education is to be evaluated in connection with other elements of their regular duties. It is appraised with due account of the effect it produces on the development of the necessary moral, political and combat qualities, discipline, and progress in combat training and execution of duties.

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ARMED FORCES

COMMANDER'S WORK WITH SUBORDINATES DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 29-30

[Article by Col I. Konovalov: "Individual Work with Subordinates"]

[Text]

THE WORK of an army or naval commander and political worker is multifaceted and involves responsibility. This is due not only to the constant advance being made in weaponry, other military equipment and methods of warfare, but also to the fact that the educational level of the men has risen immensely. They are people of varied interests, who are endowed with markedly individual features.

Individuals call for a differentiated approach. Practical experience has convincingly shown that education is more effective if mass forms of work are supplemented by individual work of commanders and superiors in general with their subordinates.

The individual approach to every man is a fundamental principle of instruction and education. The commander or political worker must exercise pedagogical influence with due account of the individual's distinctive features.

Knowledge of a subordinate's individual traits is the direct duty of an officer. The Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces state that the commander must come to know his men through contacts with them on and off duty. He should know their proficiency level and political and moral qualities.

The purpose of the individual approach is not only to exercise a positive influence on the individual man and to promote his education, but also to weld a military collective, to enhance the unit's level of combat readiness. How should this work be carried out?

The commander should come to know his men. He must know not only his demographic data, but also his biography, political, general educational and cultural level, character, condition of health, abilities, inclinations, habits, aptitude for recall, quickness of response and resourcefulness.

Knowing a man's qualities is only the beginning of individual work. The commander should find ways to promote the man's good traits, and help him get rid of his negative features, of everything that prevents him from becoming a good soldier. This work is conducted mainly within the company or equivalent subunit. The private and sergeant are chiefly moulded in the company through pertinent instruction and education.

When young recruits join the subunit the officer seeks to know his men as quickly as possible, to establish his abilities and inclinations. This makes it possible to rule out errors in appointments and to provide the

necessary help. Individual talks are a most effective form of work here. The officer can discuss a wide range of subjects with a man. But the first thing he should do is to win the man's confidence.

Private Ye. Khashchinin, a young recruit, started his period of active service successfully. He was making good progress in mastering combat equipment. He was an optimistic boy full of love for life. But suddenly he became indifferent to his duties and reserved in his attitude towards the others. First the sergeant had a talk with him, but could not find out the cause of the change. Senior Lieutenant A. Tarasov, deputy company commander for political affairs, decided to have a talk with the boy.

What moved Private Khashchinin was the confidential, informal way in which the political worker talked to him, the officer's interest in his pre-army life and pursuits. The soldier told the political worker that his wife had quarrelled with his parents and, taking their child, went to live in a flat without conveniences. The senior lieutenant promised to help. That same day he wrote a letter to the local authorities. Soon a reply was received to the effect that the soldier's family was given suitable housing.

At an exercise Private Khashchin distinguished himself. The political worker wrote a letter to the soldier's wife commending him on his behaviour. When the boy learnt about this he said to the political worker:

"I apologise for my behaviour to the collective. This will never happen again."

This case also showed that Senior Lieutenant A. Tarasov had found a correct approach to the man. He regularly plans personal talks with the men. He always finds a good reason for such a talk. He knows that to ensure the necessary effect, the talk should be frank and the man must be in the right mood for it.

Another important point is who should display the initiative in the talk. If it is the senior lieutenant, he will determine in advance the line to be pursued and the subject to be discussed. But quite often he is approached by the men. In this case the deputy company commander for political affairs will try to get to the heart of the man's needs. If they are legitimate, he will do his best to meet them. If a man is wrong and his request is unfounded the political worker will show why nothing can be done and explain to the man his error.

Senior Lieutenant Tarasov says:

"A heart to heart talk with a man does not mean saying only pleasantries to him. If he misbehaves, you must condemn his actions. But I always try to hear a man attentively. I am never rude to him and I shall never offend his sense of personal dignity. When you meet a man, you don't tell him straightaway to give you his life story or ask him how he is getting on at the moment. A talk will produce good results only if you manage to kindle the man's interest and a desire to

discuss with you all matters of concern to him."

Individual aid is a part of personal work with the men. This aid is rendered by the commanding officer, political worker, Party and YCL organisations, and by his own comrades. The socialist principle of doing your best to help your comrades acquires the force of a regulation requirement in the army and navy. The Interior Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces oblige the serviceman to cherish army and naval comradeship, to help one's comrades by word and deed, to prevent them from performing acts that would discredit them, and to help them in danger at the risk of one's own life.

The purpose of comradesly assistance is above all to inspire confidence in one's own ability, to show your comrade the way to master combat skills on his own. He who learns to surmount difficulties on his own, sooner acquires confidence and makes good progress. However, if he cannot cope with the difficulties on his own, the commander and his comrades will never leave him without help.

The individual approach implies that the officer should constantly keep abreast of the work and achievements of every serviceman, exercise a corrective influence in training and organising the socialist emulation movement to promote knowledge and proficiency.

It is vital to get the men involved in active public life and activities. If a soldier or seaman does useful work which interests him in his spare time, he acquires a sense of responsibility for the job he is doing. This enables the commander and political worker to develop independence in the men, to promote activeness, initiative and a de-

sire to engage in socially useful work. When a soldier or seaman carries out a social assignment with due account of his abilities and inclinations, it raises the level of his political consciousness and helps him acquire organisational skills.

The serviceman lives, trains and executes his duties together with his comrades under constant influence of the collective. The effect of this influence largely depends on how the commander and political worker rely on the collective in their work.

Captain G. Morozov, motorised infantry company commander, and his deputy for political affairs know this very well. The commander regards the Party organisation as his main support. The Communists set a personal example in training, execution of duties and discipline. They form the core of the military collective, exercising a favourable influence on the other servicemen and helping to remove shortcomings. The commander and his deputy for political affairs work closely with the company Party and YCL organisations. They seek the advice of the secretaries and their opinions on the men, their sentiments and interests. Communist and YCL activists in turn learn from the company commander and political worker the knowledge of individual work and apply it in practice.

Regular individual work with servicemen is an important instrument of political and military education, and combat training. It is the commander and his deputy for political affairs that organise this work and the entire process of training, instruction and education. It is they that bear full responsibility for the standards of combat training, political education and discipline in the subunit.

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MARSHAL M. TUKHACHEVSKIY'S BIOGRAPHY SKETCHED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 36-37

[Article by Col Z. Aleksandrov, under the heading "Our Calendar": Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy (90th Birth Anniversary)]

[Text]

ONE DAY in June 1918 a train arrived in Samara (now Kuibyshev). A trim young man of medium height with big blue eyes lightly jumped down from the step of a carriage. He quickly walked over to the group of military men meeting him. This man was Mikhail Tukhachevsky, just appointed Commander of the 1st Army of the Eastern Front on the recommendation of V. I. Lenin, Chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars. At first the commander's youth somewhat confused officers of the army staff. Moreover, the fact that he was an officer of the old Russian army also gave rise to distrust on the part of some commanders. Only his friends knew how much M. Tukhachevsky managed to experience in his 25 years, how outstanding were his capabilities and how firmly he believed in the force of Lenin's truth, in the bright future of his beloved Russia.

The son of an impoverished nobleman and a simple Russian peasant M. N. Tukhachevsky (February 16, 1893 — June 11, 1937) was born not far from the old Russian town of Smolensk. As a child he took a fancy to the art of warfare and decided to become an officer. He finished a cadet school and, by the beginning of the First World War, the Alexander Military School in Moscow. From September 1914, Tukhachevsky was at the front. The young officer was noted for his unusual courage. It was not fortuitous that he was awarded six combat decorations within several months. In February 1915 Tukhachevsky was taken prisoner; he immediately made an attempt to escape, but failed. He made another three attempts but only the fifth one was successful.

From Switzerland through neutral countries Tukhachevsky returned to Russia in the autumn of 1917. In the watershed of feverish events he quickly found his place, i.e. together with the revolutionary people. Later on Tukhachevsky would say: "My real life began with the October Revolution and my joining the Red Army."

Early in 1918 Tukhachevsky worked in the Military Department of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee* fulfilling responsible assignments to organise a new workers'

and peasants' army. In April of the same year he was admitted to the Communist Party. In May he was already Military Commissar of Defence of the Moscow Area. Now he arrived at the Eastern Front where, as Lenin put it, the destiny of the Revolution was in the balance. In his address to the fighting men of the army the young commander and Communist wrote: "The purpose of the socialist army of the proletariat is not only to offer resistance and wage a defensive war. In this way we would not save our young Soviet Republic. It is necessary as soon as possible, just now, to move forward, it is necessary to advance. Any delay is like death."

The Commander knew well how to foster strength and organisation quickly among personnel when he asked the central Party and military agencies and the front staff to immediately send to the army more Communists. The army soon became an efficient force. Having passed over to the offensive along with other armies of the Eastern Front it hurled the enemy far to the east by December 1918.

Already in those battles Tukhachevsky showed originality of thought in elaborating operations, firmly and competently exercised troop control during combat actions. He daringly took upon himself the responsibility and unhesitatingly ran risks if the situation demanded. His decisions and actions, however, were always grounded and thoroughly analysed, and taken with due account of real possibilities. He deeply realised the decisive importance of the Party-political work in the forces. In working out an operation the army commander always took into consideration the morale of the fighting men, persistently sought to improve Party-political work in the army. Lenin said of the 5th Army of the Eastern Front under M. Tukhachevsky in 1919 that in just one year it developed from a small group into a real army, strong by its revolutionary spirit and united in victorious battles defending the Volga and defeating the White Guard Army under Admiral Kolchak.

The Party sent Tukhachevsky to the roughest sectors and fronts. After the Eastern Front he was appointed Deputy Commander of the Southern Front in December 1918 and then was again in command of an army on the Southern and Eastern fronts. In the last year of the Civil War (1920) Tukhachevsky was the Commander of the Caucasian and then the Western fronts.

Even in a combat situation, when he was extremely busy, he always found time to study Marxism-Leninism deeply, and on the basis of its principles, began to work out many questions dealing with the strategy and operational art of the young Soviet military science.

In the 1920s and 1930s when Tukhachevsky occupied important posts, his talents as a military theoretician and practitioner were revealed with even greater force. In 1925-28 Tukhachevsky was Chief of Staff of the Red Army. Later on

* All-Russia Central Executive Committee — supreme body of state power in the country between congresses of Soviets. After the formation of the USSR in 1922 it became the Central Executive Committee of the USSR (up to 1937).

he was in command of the Leningrad Military District (1928-31), then worked simultaneously as Deputy People's Commissar, Chairman of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, and Chief of Armaments of the Red Army (1931-34). In 1934 he was appointed Deputy and in 1936 First Deputy of the People's Commissar for Defence and Chief of the Department of Combat Training of the Red Army.

At these posts Tukhachevsky persistently strived to comprehensively increase combat efficiency of the Red Army, equip it with up-to-date materiel, and rapidly develop new fighting services and arms of the Soviet Armed Forces, including aviation, mechanised and airborne forces.

Tukhachevsky paid great attention to the development of the Soviet Navy. In 1928, on the basis of his report: "On the Significance and Tasks of the Navy in the System of the Country's Armed Forces" the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR adopted a decision which said in part that in the development of the navy it was imperative "to strive to combine the surface and submarine fleets, coastal and mine-positional defence and naval air arm."

Mikhail Tukhachevsky displayed tireless concern for the training of command and political personnel and military specialists. Thus, in his report to the Command of the Red Army on March 27, 1932 he proposed in connection with a sharp growth of requirements for engineers of various specialties to immediately detail from the Military-Technical Academy a number of independent academies. This proposal was accepted and played an important role in training qualified technical personnel.

Tukhachevsky also did much to develop Soviet military art and science. Studying new theories of tactics and operational art he strived in the course of the exercises and manoeuvres to check them in field conditions, to introduce all useful elements in the practice of training forces. Tukhachevsky actively participated in the elaboration of the theory of a deep battle which in the future became the basis of tactical training of the Red Army.

Over 120 works on various questions of strategy, operational art, tactics and education and training of forces were written by Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Drawing on technological achievements of his time, the experience of WWI and the Civil War, he advanced a number of important theoretical propositions.

Such works by Tukhachevsky as "The National and Class Strategy," "Manoeuvre and Artillery," "Questions of Contemporary Strategy" and others are widely known.

Tukhachevsky's scholarly works exerted a considerable influence on the development of military thought and practical build-up of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the theories expressed in them were borne out during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45).

Tukhachevsky's merits were highly appraised. He was awarded the Orders of Lenin, Red Banner and an Honorary Revolutionary Weapon. In 1935 he was among the first Soviet military leaders to be promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky was a Candidate Member to the Party Central Committee

and a Member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

A talented military leader, he, as his contemporaries testify, was a sensitive and responsive man and a charming interlocutor who was keen on music, painting and astronomy, and knew several foreign languages. He displayed a great interest in all new developments in the field of science, technology and art. In many phenomena and facts he was able to see the beginnings of a great deed. That concerned not only military matters. Thus, replying to sceptics who did not believe in the future of Tsiolkovsky's ideas about cosmic flights (today he has been recognised by the whole world as the founder of contemporary rocketry) he said: "I believe in Tsiolkovsky's ideas and I hope that they have a brilliant future."

The name of Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky has for ever become a prominent one among outstanding military leaders of the Soviet state.

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ARMED FORCES

PHYSICAL TRAINING FOR SERVICEMEN DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 61-62

[Article by Lt Col V. Shchegolev, under the heading "Physical Culture and Sport": "Conditioning Young Soldiers"]

[Text]

With the arrival of new recruits in military units commanders strive to train them to master the military art as quickly as possible. The emphasis is placed on physical conditioning and psychological steeling. In conjunction with physical instructors and with constant medical supervision, the commanders of subunits upgrade the training of young soldiers and make use of a number of methods particularly important at the initial stage of military service.

The prime factor taken into account is that the early period of military service involves a certain break with a person's set routine of work and rest, and heavier physical and psychological loads. For many, adaptation entails to a certain extent reduced work ability and a poorer general state.

The tasks of physical training at this period are to reduce and neutralise the negative changes occurring in the soldiers, raising the level of multifarious physical conditioning, and developing an interest in the exercises, as well as consolidating proper relations among the newcomers. The exercises are conducted in a comprehensive fashion. The soldiers do general health improving calisthenics and movements de-

signed to develop strength, agility, speed and tenacity.

Strength-building exercises include those on the horizontal bar (pull-ups, leg-raising, pull-ups with turn), parallel bars (pull-ups, raising and lowering of the legs, sit-ups), push-ups, cable-crawling and paired exercises.

Short sprints, the 10×10 m relay, long and high-jumping and game sports develop speed. Acrobatic and gymnastic exercises, horse-vaulting, negotiating individual obstacles, trench exercises and combined relays develop agility in the soldiers. 1.5-2 km cross country marches (later 3-4 km double-time marches with gear for subunits) gradually work up tenacity in the young soldiers.

Group exercises are held for soldiers of the same fitness level. This makes it possible to concentrate instructors' efforts on improving upon the weak points in the given group.

During the exercise process the instructor maintains a well-wishing atmosphere and furnishes assistance. Closer attention is accorded the soldiers as they master new methods and actions, and more conditioned soldiers are assigned to aid them.

During the first three or four weeks no fewer than three physical

training sessions are held per week. To instill a positive attitude to the exercises among the young soldiers, the programme is made to include fast-moving games, military sport relays, etc., which help create the proper psychological setting and make the outfit more closely knit.

An effective form of training is daily morning calisthenics, which toughens the body and heightens its work capacity. At this time the soldiers do previously learned sets of floor exercises and movements on gymnastics apparatus. The session ends with 500-600 metres of jogging and 200-300 metres of walking.

For soldiers who have served for some two months, training sessions in spring and summer are held on an obstacle course, where they negotiate individual facilities and sectors or run through the entire course as a test exercise.

Mass sports work is arranged within the daily routine. It is based on the Military Sports Complex and the Military Sports Classification. Soldiers compete on the squad or crew level in game or other team sports. Applied skills and special and psychological qualities are upgraded in game (football, handball, basketball) or combined applied military relays involving simulated fires,

smoke, noise, etc. This helps develop boldness, decisiveness and doggedness.

As subunits proceed to combat and tactical training venues and return from them commanders frequently make use of what is known as accompanying training. This involves competitions for speed in negotiating a certain portion of the itinerary, surmounting natural and

man-made obstacles, water barriers, obstructions and other impediments.

Transport to exercise venues in vehicles is used for training soldiers in rapid embarkation and disembarkation. At first the personnel perfects its skills in executing different actions when the vehicle is stopped, and later, when it is in motion, the speed being gradually increased to 10-15 km per hour.

Each session, morning calisthenics and accompanying training is conducted at a rapid, tense pace, which is achieved by a reduction in time for formation and movement as apparatus are changed, by concise explanations, execution of exercises simultaneously by all servicemen, and by rational use of equipment and gear.

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AIR FORCES

AIR-GROUND COOPERATION IN INTERCEPTOR MISSIONS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 18-20

[Article by Col A. Fedorov, military pilot 1st class, under the heading "Combat Training": "Team-Work"]

[Text]

A fighter squadron was engaged in an exercise that approached to the maximum conditions of actual combat. The pilots were flying sorties in search of air targets and attacking them with live ammunition. Both the flyers and command post personnel experienced many exciting moments when the interceptors closed in on the targets. But they all managed to accomplish their missions and work. Though faced with a shortage of time and though the "enemy" resorted to manoeuvre, the pilots did not miss a single target, and executed all the commands coming from the ground.

The success of the interception missions was largely due to the excellent team-work of the pilots and command post crews, particularly the aircraft controllers. Of course, this could not have been achieved if it were not for the flawless functioning of the means of communication and radar systems.

Team-work is achieved if there is coordination between the pilot and the command post personnel in pursuit of a common mission. The level of team-work depends on the individual proficiency and sense of personal responsibility of every man for his job, on a common understanding of the dynamics of flight and knowledge of the actions each has to fulfil, on meticulous execution of one's duty and mission assigned, and also on the faultless functioning of the equipment.

To give adequate support to the pilot the command post crew must know the performance characteristics of friendly and enemy aircraft and the tactics of both sides; it must be proficient in the operation of the guidance equipment, control

means and in fighter guidance methods. In addition, the crew should be thoroughly briefed on the pilot's mission.

Team-work is developed through training. Joint drills are highly useful. Both the pilots and command post crews take part in them. Special trainers make it possible to simulate any type of air combat in its dynamics. During the drills both the pilots and aircraft controllers learn to cope with all sorts of narratives the staff prepares for them. For instance, an aircraft controller makes the calculations, takes a decision and issues a command to the pilot. The latter carries it out. The results of the attack are recorded and then the officer in charge of the lesson analyses the operation in detail.

To enhance the effect the aircraft controllers train with the pilots they will be working with in interception missions. Personal contacts enable the command post crews to get to know the flyers, their psychological make-up and individual qualities. It often happens that an experienced aircraft controller will help a young pilot turn in a better performance in the air and eliminate his errors.

Preparation for the flight is checked jointly too.

Cooperation between the pilot and the command post crew in a mission starts as soon as the radar spots an air target. The commander or senior officer of the command post crew appraises the situation and assigns the mission. The aircraft controller makes the necessary calculations at the plotter to determine the line from which the interceptors are to take off and reports to the commanding officer the time to take off.

The interception mission comprises two stages: guidance from the ground and self-guidance with the aid of aircraft means or visual methods. During the first stage it is the job of the command post crew to guide the fighter to a tactically advantageous position which would enable him to sight the target and execute an effective attack. The command post crew does its bit with the help of radar and communication equipment.

When the pilot is flying an interception mission, his own position and that of the target constantly changing, it is difficult for him to make all the necessary calculations. Therefore, while airborne, he controls the plane in keeping with commands received from the aircraft controller. In the beginning the latter gives complete information to the pilot. To facilitate the search for and spotting of the target, the aircraft controller informs the pilot of its position, air speed, direction and altitude. At the final stage, when the interceptor has been brought within sight of the target, the pilot is informed about its position in relation to that of his

own to help him spot the "enemy." For instance, the aircraft controller gives the direction in which the pilot should look in relation to his own course (target directly ahead, ahead to the left, etc.), relative bearing, altitude (above or below the target in metres) and range to the target. The command post gives this information to the pilot only if it has the exact data on the position of the target in relation to the interceptor. The aircraft controller looks at the blips of both on the screen of the radar plan position indicator.

As soon as the pilot reports to the command post that he has sighted the target (visually or with his on-board radar), the aircraft controller will give him no further command. However, he will continue to track and check the position of the interceptor in relation to the target till the air engagement is over.

During the engagement the aircraft controller watches the air situation and informs the pilot on the approach of other targets, on separation of blips from group targets and on their manoeuvres. The command post crew appraises the air situation and weather conditions, reckons the flying time and reserve of fuel. This information is reported to the commander. When the latter decides to withdraw the fighter from the engagement and chooses the airfield he should land on, the aircraft controller gives the pilot the course, the time and altitude, and checks the arrival of the plane in the appointed area.

An analysis of joint actions will show that at the stage of ground guidance it is the command post crew that plays the main role in the interception mission. When the interceptor closes in on the target, the volume of work of the pilot and, hence, his role in cooperation increase very sharply. At the final stage the command post crew actually checks the actions of the pilot. Its duty is to render him immediate aid in the event of a deviation from the original plan or of a sudden change in the air situation.

During a training interception mission the fighter took a bit too long in pursuing the "enemy." The latter manoeuvred so skilfully that the pursuer could not assume a suitable position for launching his missiles. The aircraft controller who kept track of the engagement on the radar indicator screen noticed that the fighter was always a fraction of a second too late in responding to the "enemy's" manoeuvre. Foreseeing the "enemy's" next move the aircraft controller issued a pertinent command to the pilot in time to enable him to destroy the target.

Tremendous skill is required to control interceptors today. To master this skill both the flyers and command post crews must persistently improve team-work contributing to each other's experience and proficiency. It is not only the technique, but also the mutual psychological understanding that is important. For instance, if a pilot senses firm guidance on the part of the aircraft controller he will have greater confidence in the success of his mission. As a rule, in such a case he will quickly gain a tactically advantageous position for the attack and secure a hit on the target in the first approach and with the first missile he fires.

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GROUND FORCES

COMBAT SECURITY IN A FORWARD POSITION DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 p 23

[Unattributed article under the heading "Modern Battle: Questions and Answers": "Advanced Position and Combat Security"]

[Text]

For what purpose and when are an advanced position and combat security organised?

In order to mislead the enemy as to the layout of the FEBA and battle formation and to force him to deliver fire blows at false, thinly held or unoccupied areas, advanced positions and combat security are organised before the forward edge.

As a rule, an advanced position is organised out of contact with the enemy in the separate important directions in order to protect subunits of the first echelon from a surprise enemy attack, to make enemy reconnaissance difficult and to force the enemy to deploy the main forces prematurely. Usually it is chosen behind corresponding obstacles at a distance which makes it possible to support subunits holding defence positions by artillery fire from the main line of defence.

On the advanced position company and separate platoon strong points are organised which intercept the probable directions of the enemy offensive.

Motorised or tank subunits comprising a reinforced com-

pany or a battalion are detailed from the forces of the first echelon for fighting on the forward edge. Their mission is to win time for the main forces to take up defensive positions, to prepare fire blows, to organise positions with engineer works and also to create advantageous conditions for destroying tactical nuclear weapons of the enemy prior to their approach to the forces holding the defence.

On sectors where there is no close contact with the enemy and an advanced position is not organised, a motorised infantry battalion of the first echelon sends a combat security. The distance of a combat security from the FEBA should be such that it is supported by fire of the first echelon subunits.

When there is a killing ground in the defence area a combat security is always organised. It is located between the company strong points of the battalion first echelon (see Sketch).

On the position of a combat security strong points and fire emplacements are organised.


Strong points and gaps between them are covered with obstacles.

Manpower and equipment of a combat security depend on the situation and are determined by senior commander. More often than not a reinforced motorised infantry platoon is detailed to a combat security. It is supported by fire of artillery and mortars both of a battalion and a senior commander.

It is the battalion CO who controls the actions of a combat security. Therefore, reliable communication in a subunit should be organised first of all. When fighting to hold the position of a combat security

the command and observation post of a battalion can be located in one of the strong points of the first echelon companies. If a combat security abandons positions and begins a retreat the battalion CO moves to the area of the main disposition of the battalion CP-OP.

As a rule, a combat security does not engage small groups. When the superior enemy forces pass over to the offensive a combat security by fire and stubborn defence of the occupied positions holds up his forward subunits and forces the main body of the enemy troops to deploy into battle formation.



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GROUND FORCES

AIRBORNE TROOPS FUNCTION, ORGANIZATION SKETCHED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 24-26

[Unattributed article, under the heading "The Soviet Armed Forces";
"Airborne Troops"]

[Text]

The airborne troops are intended for operations in the enemy rear. They are capable of delivering surprise blows, capturing and holding important lines deep in the enemy rear, destroying troop control, capturing islands, sectors of a sea coast and naval and air bases, assisting the advancing forces in crossing water barriers and quickly negotiating mountainous areas. The airborne troops fulfil their missions in cooperation with the formations and units of various fighting services and arms.

The airborne troops consist of parachute, artillery, self-propelled artillery and other units and subunits. Their personnel are trained in parachute jumping on any terrain. Self-propelled mounts and other materiel are dropped in the enemy rear or delivered by air to the captured aerodromes. The parachute equipment makes it possible to do this in any weather conditions and on any terrain, by day and by night, and in limited areas.

Paratroopers courageously and confidently jump from modern high-speed military-transport aircraft and are equally skilled in the specialities of submachine gunners, artillerymen, driver-mechanics, sappers, radio operators and recon men.

Only those who are better trained emerge victorious in battle. Therefore, combat training and political education in the airborne troops are arranged in such a way as to teach the personnel to act competently under any conditions. Practical studies are combined with theoretical learning, while the curriculum pursues one goal — to de-

velop in the fighting men the ability to control themselves in various situations and fulfil exactly the assigned missions.

The following method of training is widespread among the paratroopers. An arbitrary point is chosen on the map. Then a parachute subunit is dropped there for carrying out the assigned mission. The criteria of the degree of readiness of the fighting men are: their ability to cover several dozen kilometres through forests, mountains and marshes, to find and organise places for the night rest and to remain unnoticed by the enemy. Paratroopers excellently cope with these complicated missions.

High physical conditioning, strength and endurance, an ability to orient oneself on the terrain well enough and to be a master in hand-to-hand fighting are particularly necessary for paratroopers. That's why sport figures so prominently in the airborne troops. The conditions created for studies are excellent. Every unit has its own sports grounds, gymnasiums, swimming pools and facilities for volleyball, basketball, handball, boxing, sambo, gymnastics. Every paratrooper is given a rating in parachute jumping. Quite a few outstanding sportsmen who more than once successfully took part in international competitions serve in the airborne troops.

Using modern training facilities, experienced officers competently train and educate the servicemen. Also at the disposal of the paratroopers are automated teaching devices, TV, radio facilities and mechanised tactical fields and fire ranges, autodromes and parachute training grounds.

As a whole, service in the airborne troops promotes not only definite qualities inherent in this fighting arm. During his two-year service a fighting man is steeled spiritually and morally, and educated as a patriot-internationalist.

In the Soviet Armed Forces, as in the airborne troops, the men are trained not only in handling weapons and combat equipment. Service in the Soviet Armed Forces is, first of all, a school of education, where every soldier acquires deep technical and professional knowledge, solid political education and ideological steeling.

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GROUND FORCES

T-72 TANK ARMAMENT MAINTENANCE DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 34-35

[Article by Eng Col N. Shevchenko, under the heading "Specialist's Tips":
"Care of the T-72 Tank Armament"]

[Text]

Timely and proper care of the T-72 tank armament ensures its high reliability in various operating conditions. Periodic checks of tank systems, instruments, assemblies and mechanisms, their timely adjustment, cleaning and lubrication play a great role in maintaining its high combat efficiency.

Soft and unstable grounds greatly complicate the use of tank armament. Dirt, dust and sand, mixing with the solid matter of powder combustion products, foul the armament assemblies and mechanisms and if not removed in good time, may cause the armament to fail. Therefore the cleaning of gun and machine-gun barrels and careful removal of dust and dirt in the fighting compartment is a component part of any type of maintenance.

The tank armament is inspected before the routine maintenance, when preparing the tank for firing and combat, and afterward. The scope of the maintenance work is determined by operating instructions and cannot be reduced. Other operations, apart from those specified by the instructions, can be also carried out if the shortcomings revealed during checking so require.

The quality and scope of maintenance operations to be done depend in many respects on how carefully they are organised within the subunit.

Described below is an example of their organisation in a tank company commanded by Senior Lieutenant R. Khusainov.

1. BEFORE GUNNERY

Preparations of tanks for tactical exercises with combat firing were carried out in the company in compliance with the instructions of the battalion commander. Together with the company technician, Senior Lieutenant Khusainov determined the volume and priority of maintenance operations to be done, and organised studying by the personnel of the content and methods of performing basic maintenance operations. Through corresponding channels of command he made applications for required materials and spare parts

and monitored their reception from the depot.

The artillery mechanic selected and prepared appliances and tools not included in the tank spare part set which might be of use in performing maintenance operations, such as facilities for checking the counter-recoil mechanism and adding liquid into the recoil brake and recuperator, the boresighting gauge and appliances for checking and adjusting the stabiliser. This done, he checked the condition of the boards on which verification and registration targets were secured and dummy

rounds used to check the gun automatic loader for serviceability.

Prior to maintenance operations, specialised teams were made up for checking counterrecoil and loading mechanisms for proper functioning and for checking and adjusting the stabiliser. The teams included specialists from the regiment repair subunit and the battalion maintenance section. The teams were provided with the necessary tools and materials, and practical lessons with their personnel were carried out.

The company commander saw to it that all workplaces were prepared in advance. The attached maintenance vehicle was fully deployed and its equipment was brought out and sited at workplaces. Expendable materials to be issued to the crews were prepared. Special racks were made near each tank for the removed equipment, required tools and expendable materials, and for cleaning machine guns and breechblocks.

Prior to maintenance procedures, R. Khusainov assigned missions to platoon leaders, in which he specified the time for beginning and ending maintenance operations, the priority of their execution, the scope of the work to be done, and instructions for the specialised teams, and indicated what they had to do before their arrival at the tank parking area and how to organise supervision of every phase and quality of maintenance.

Proceeding from the condition of each tank and company commander's instructions, the platoon leaders worked out assignments for the crews and immediately before the beginning of maintenance operations briefed the personnel on safety measures.

Though the tankmen had sufficient maintenance experience and practical skills obtained during previous technical training lessons and exercises, all maintenance operations were carried out with the use of maintenance requirement cards which specify the procedure and conditions for performing maintenance operations and safety measures to be observed.

Preparation of the armament for firing began with the removal of grease from gun and machine-gun barrels, following which they were wiped dry and carefully checked. Then breechblocks, trigger mechanisms and interlocks were examined. A wedge was installed, and the tankmen checked operation of breechblock mechanisms and semi-automatic gears, electrical and ma-

nual trigger mechanisms, elevating and traversing systems.

After visual inspection of counter-recoil mechanisms the specialised team, headed by the artillery mechanic, measured the amount of liquid in recoil brakes and recuperators and pressure in the latter.

Together with the crew, the team specially organised for checking the automatic loader inspected the unloaded cells and the cell hoisting mechanism for condition, following which the crew cleaned them of dust, dirt and old lubricant.

Then the tankmen checked the condition of conveyor support rollers by manually turning the turret. If the rollers rotated with difficulty, they were removed, cleaned, washed in kerosene or diesel fuel and carefully reinstalled.

Having assembled the gun automatic loader, the team, jointly with the crew, checked the whole cycle of automatic loading, using dummy rounds. In so doing, dummy rounds were not loaded into the cell to avoid their being driven out from the breechblock chamber.

The fighting compartment is ventilated during firing by an air filter unit. It is prohibited to fire from organic weapons if this unit is faulty or if overpressure in it is less than 35 mm H₂O. Therefore the company commander and platoon leaders carefully checked all maintenance operations performed on the air filter unit.

The fire power of a modern tank depends not only on the quality of its armament but also on the efficiency of fire control instruments and devices. Every tankman knows that but nevertheless Senior Lieutenant R. Khusainov considered it his duty to remind his subordinates once more of this axiom and personally check the servicing of weapon stabilisers and their operation in all modes. Stabilisers with evident defects and those that had to undergo Main-

tenance No. 2 were carefully adjusted.

Of course, the main volume of work in preparing the armament for firing was done by the gunners. In addition to stabilisers they had to check the ranging sight and the rods of the parallel gun linkage for proper fastening, the external surfaces of protective walls and lenses for cleanliness, the manual and electrical range finding drives for serviceability (throughout the whole range) and the proper functioning of devices providing the lighting of the night vision sight reticle and scale.

The gunners also adjusted the height of the seats, the ranging sight eyepieces to the interpupillary base, fixed head-rests in the required position and fitted the eyepiece diopter rings.

The checks completed and disrepairs eliminated, the tank commanders and gunners, under direct supervision of platoon leaders, performed collimation and checked range finders for proper functioning. For collimation a terrain point located at a considerable distance from the tank was used. If for some reasons it was impossible, a foresighting target was used.

Then boresight adjustment of night vision sights was performed and the searchlight axes were checked to see that they were in line with the direction of sighting.

The company commander kept a record of the main operations performed according to the earlier drawn up schedule, monitored the work of the specialised teams and checked at random the quality of the work done by the personnel and their observation of safety precautions.

The company technician helped Senior Lieutenant R. Khusainov control maintenance operations and personally checked that the procedure, quality and scope of the work done corresponded to the established standards and that the personnel strictly observed safety precaution

rules. He saw to it that the crews were supplied with the requisite materials and tools, and took necessary steps for replacing used standard spare parts and materials. After finishing their work, the crews put the tools and accessories away. After hearing the reports of platoon leaders, the company commander checked at random several tanks and summed up the results of the work done.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON THE 'SOVIET MILITARY THREAT MYTH'

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 2, Feb 83 pp 43-45

[Article by O. Rzheshhevskiy, D Sc (History), under the heading "Military History": "The Soviet Military Threat Myth"]

[Text]

The Western reader has been showered to-day by a flood of publications which forecast the "inevitable" development of the 80s: "The Russians Are Coming," "They Will Come," "Red Banner over Bonn," "Bolshevisation of the USA," "The Red Army Lands in Japan" and the like. Books, newspaper columns, magazine articles, films and radio and TV broadcasts — all the mass media are trying to impose on the reader one and the same idea of an inevitable Soviet attack on the capitalist states. The campaign of lies and fabrications is assuming increasingly insane scope. What is the purpose of the Soviet threat myth, when and how was it invented?

Source and Purpose

The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 broke the chains of capitalist global rule and ushered in the historical process of the world's passing from capitalism to socialism. The Revolution in Russia proclaimed its desire to build a society free from exploitation, economic crises and unemployment, a society expressing the will of the working people, a society providing all democratic liberties and social rights. The very first legislative act of the Revolution was the Decree on Peace. In response the imperialists declared war on the young socialist state. The "New York Herald Tribune" wrote on November 22, 1917 that the allied powers put Russia in isolation in order to suppress the Bolshevik government. To justify this political course the imperialists invented and produced before the world public a myth of a "Soviet threat."

They used this myth to justify their military adventures against the Soviet Republic. "Western Civilisation Facing the Bolshevik Threat, More Sinister than the Invasion of Genghis Khan's Hordes" — this headline in the London "Daily Chronicle" is a typical example of the rabid anti-Soviet campaign, which accompanied the military intervention against Soviet Russia. The "Chicago Tribune" prophesied the invasion of America by "Red hordes," saying that there was not so many obstacles between Petrograd and Seattle. "The Red Bear" seeking to tear to shreds the "defenceless world civilisation" began to wander about the bourgeois press. Meanwhile it was not the "Red Bear" who terrorised Seattle, but the American and British soldiers who were marching through Murmansk and Archangel, the American and Japanese invaders occupying Vladivostok, and the French and British troops ruling in Odessa.

During the period between the two world wars the myth of the Soviet threat was used more than once as a smokescreen for imperialist "local" military adventures against the USSR. Among them was the imperialist-inspired provocation of militarist China against the Soviet Union in 1929, during which the Chinese militarists perpetrated a number of attacks on Soviet property and territory.

In the 30s the Japanese militarists, using the same "Soviet threat" bogus, committed numerous armed provocations against the USSR. They tried to capture a sector of Soviet land in the area of Lake Hassan near the Soviet-Manchurian border in 1938 and in 1939 they attacked the Mongolian People's Republic, a friend of the Soviet Union. The aggressor was taught a subject lesson.

Meanwhile, the clouds of a new world war were gathering in the West. The threat of war grew especially apparent as power in Germany was seized by the nazis, the most rabid terrorist dictatorship of the reactionary and aggressive circles of monopolist capital.

Behind the Screen

World War II was unleashed by the German monopolies, the nazi leadership and the German General Staff, but it was prepared by combined efforts of international imperialism to destroy the Soviet Union, the working class and the national-liberation movement. The US and British imperialists planned to fight the USSR with the hands of their rivals in the battle for world domination — Germany and Japan. In so doing they hoped to destroy the socialist state and at the same time weaken their rivals.

The biological hatred, just as the anti-Soviet declarations of the nazi leaders, seemed to convince the ruling circles in Britain, France and the USA that their calculations were correct. Betraying Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland one after the other, they persistently set nazi aggression against the USSR.

Chamberlain's close associate Wilson, visiting Berlin on the eve of the Munich Agreement which sold Czechoslovakia to nazi Germany, said on September 27, 1938 that the British government remembered Hitler's words concerning Germany and Britain being the bastion against the forces of devastation moving from the East.

In those years the Soviet Union was the only state which conducted a consistent struggle against fascism and war. The prewar historical record shows an impressive picture of the CPSU's comprehensive efforts to curb the aggressor, to create a system of collective security and to defend the peoples who fell victim to fascist aggression.

World War II started with the nazi attack against Poland, an armed collision within the imperialist camp. The leading powers of the rivaling imperialist coalitions failed to come to terms and pool efforts against the USSR.

The anti-Soviet conspiracy failed because of the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet state which skillfully took the contradictions between the imperialist forces to socialism's advantage. The Soviet Union threatened no one, but it resolutely rebuffed the aggressive provocations.

The USSR fended off all attempts to involve it in the war for two years. As the war began the USSR continued peaceful construction and built up its defences. Both of the fighting coalitions remained deeply hostile towards the Soviet Union. Even as the war started the "Western democracies" did not stop calling nazi Germany "to come to reason" and to join a crusade against the USSR.

The world reactionary press spared no effort to hammer home the idea of the allegedly growing military threat to Germany emanating from the Soviet Union. The French newspaper "Le Temps," reflecting the views of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the positions gained by Russia posed a constant threat to Germany. G. Tomson, the German Charge d'Affairs in Washington reported to his chief J. Ribbentrop, the foreign minister of Germany in those days that the preservation of a strong nazi government in Germany was considered vitally important in the United States, for it was regarded a useful assistant of Western powers in their struggle against Bolshevism.

An insane anti-Soviet campaign was unleashed in France, Britain and the USA early in 1940. The winds of an anti-Soviet crusade blew from everywhere, wrote A. Kerillis, a Western historian, about those days. There was only one general cry: "War to Russia."

In the final analysis all this enabled Nazi Germany to complete its preparations for an attack in the West which brought France, Belgium and Holland to their knees in May and June 1940. The Western powers finally lived to see the German invasion against the USSR in June 1941, but by that moment their own existence came to depend on the ability of the USSR to hold out and win.

The Nazi invaders who treacherously attacked the Soviet Union also used the myth of a Soviet threat to explain away their aggression. Ribbentrop handed the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin a memorandum on June 22, 1941 asserting that the USSR seeks to undermine Germany from within and is preparing the occupation and Bolshevization of the West European states, an invasion of the Balkans and the appropriation of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. The main task of German propaganda, admitted J. Goebbels' closest associate Frick at the Nuremberg Trial, was to justify the necessity of this invasion and to present it as a pre-emptive measure against the impending Soviet attack.

The "New York Journal American" declared its solidarity with the Nazi aggressors on June 23, 1941 saying that it hoped Europe would unite to rebuff the spreading Asian communism. It is notable that even when the US and Britain did not rely on their own forces and accepted alliance with the USSR in the struggle against the common enemy, an anti-Soviet thrust very often continued to manifest itself even in top official quarters.

As the Soviet strikes against the German invaders gained momentum, the reactionary forces accordingly increased anti-Soviet propaganda in a bid to scare the public with the alleged predatory designs of the USSR towards Europe and America. After the Soviet victory near Stalingrad the "Courier Journal" wrote in February 1943 that although the Stalingrad lesson was impressive, some people did not quite like the teacher.

The powerful strikes of the Soviet Army brought Nazi Germany to inevitable disaster. In the face of the developments the Nazi leadership began separate peace negotiations with the Western allies, during which they called upon the West to unite its ranks in a common struggle against the so-called "Red invasion."

Two Policies

After World War II the myth of the Soviet threat was turned into a major instrument to justify the imperialist aggressive, counter-revolutionary policy, directed against the USSR and other socialist countries, against the international working class movement, against the movement for the national liberation of the oppressed peoples. This myth serves to camouflage the intense activities to prepare new aggressions and to escalate the unprecedented military build-up.

The realities of the past and the present day testify to the fact that the Soviet and US approach to the world issues are directly opposite. The Soviet line in international affairs has been pivoted on the struggle for peace and security, on detente, on curbing the arms race. **"To safeguard peace — no task is more important now on the international plane for our Party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world,"** was under scored by the 26th CPSU Congress. The invariably peaceable policy of the USSR was once again reaffirmed at the 26th Congress of the CPSU, as it put forward a set of new constructive proposals on key international issues.

The ruling circles of the United States hold to a directly opposite stand, as they maintain that there are issues far more important than peace. The extent to which the myth of the so-called Soviet threat is circulated testifies to the growing militancy of US monopoly capital. Incidentally, more than one realistically minded Western politician who favoured East-West normalisation have fallen victim to that militarism.

The version of Franklin D. Roosevelt's violent death is still so persistently believed in mainly because it put an end not only to F.D. Roosevelt's physical life but also to his political line towards the US-USSR cooperation in war and peace. As if foreseeing future developments Roosevelt warned the US Congress in his last message that the United States should respect its obligations as an ally or it would have to assume the responsibility for a new world disaster. President Harry Truman and his Administration did not heed the warning. They were possessed by the idea of "US world leadership" and "rolling back communism." No wonder why the mystery of President J. Kennedy's assassination has been so closely guarded in the US even now. But many people in the United States firmly believe that he signed his own death sentence when he proposed in 1963 to review the United States' role in the world and to modify the US foreign policy accordingly. Richard Nixon's political demise can also be explained along the

same lines. By accepting the concept of peaceful coexistence and agreeing to slow down the arms race in the strategic sphere he in effect made an attempt on the basic principle of the American way of life — the cult of force.

Today the ultra-conservative elite represented by Ronald Reagan and his Administration prefers to revolve in the vicious circle of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism, to continue the fruitless course of military brinkmanship while telling the American and the world public the same old tale of the "Red bogey" coming from the East.

History has proved that the big lie of a Soviet threat in all its variations has always been a vicious instrument of the reactionary imperialist forces seeking to obstruct the path of progress and to plunge the world into the abyss of a new world war.

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